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Robert Stüwe 
EU External Energy Policy in Natural Gas: 
A Case of Neofunctionalist Integration? 
Research question 
Historically, energy security policy has been the experimental laboratory of 
Neofunctionalism. As a theory which was invented by Ernst Bernard Haas, 
it explains the expansive spillover-logic behind the post-war creation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom) as peace-preserving institutions, causing 
functional pressures for the integration of related economic sectors and the 
incremental pooling of political resources in a ‘high authority’. The 
mentioned energy institutions were established as tools, with an underlying 
security rationale, for the integration of Germany to prevent its unilateral 
military resurgence as a threat to internal peace in Europe.  
The target of today’s EU energy security policies is mainly Russia. As a 
consequence of Russia’s de facto autocracy, political and economic 
integration goals are much harder to attain. Furthermore, attitudes in EU 
member states vary between seeking interdependence with the Kremlin and 
independence from it. Since the gas supply disruptions in 2006 and 2009 
(‘gas crises’) and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, dependence on Russia 
is increasingly viewed as a vulnerability. The Energy Union Strategy, 
which has been adopted by EU institutions to ensure mutual solidarity in 
the event of a supply shortfall, is shaped by this shift in threat perceptions. 
It takes account of the political leverage Russia possesses as a result of 
supplying more than one third of total EU gas imports via its state-
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controlled export monopoly Gazprom (37.5 per cent in 20151). However, 
the extent to which external source diversification away from Russia 
should take place is a recurringly disputed theme between national capitals. 
It has gained center stage with the case of Nord Stream 2, the Baltic Sea 
pipeline between Russia and Germany. 
The fact that external political risks to EU energy security have moved to 
the top of the policy agenda puts a strong question mark behind the 
continued validity of the neofunctionalist spillover-concept for integration; 
which was developed to explain how the EU mitigated internal threats. 
Against the backdrop of constraining factors to the validity of 
neofunctionalist theory such as prevailing sovereignty perceptions, shifting 
national security concerns, the following research question arises: Do EU 
natural gas security policies follow the conceptual expectations of 
neofunctionalist integration?  
This paper starts from the hypothesis that the EU Commission, as the key 
promoting actor of a common external energy policy, makes use of 
‘spillover’-strategies and related approaches set out by neofunctionalist 
theory (see Table 1). In order to single out the role of interest-driven actors 
in spillover or spillback-processes, section 1 operationalizes the concept 
into the components ‘functional spillover’, ‘political spillover’ and 
‘institutional spillover’. Drawing upon this categorization, the analysis of 
the dependent parameter – the degree of European integration – will be 
conducted from sections 2 to 4.  
Specifically, section 2 places its emphasis on the functional pressures of 
gas policy harmonization member states have faced as a result from the 
supply /transit crises in 2006 and 2009. Section 3 (‘political spillovers’) 
examines how political actors in natural gas security learn from existing 
integration dynamics (or hinder them) and transfer their loyalties to a ‘high 
authority’, whereas section 4 (‘institutional spillover’) tries to identify 
 
1  See Eurostat (2017) “Shedding light on energy in the EU. A guided tour of energy 
statistics”, retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/ 
bloc-2c.html (last accessed: 26th of April 2017).  
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whether and how spillover-processes within the EU lead to the creation of 
new institutions within EU structures and beyond. This study shall 
culminate in the conclusion put forward in section 5 to shed light on the 
extent to which EU natural gas policies follow neofunctionalist 
prescriptions.  
A revisit of Neofunctionalism in the given analytical context is particularly 
warranted against the backdrop of disintegration in times of Brexit and 
right-wing autocratic populism which could well spread to the field of 
energy security. In this context, this paper will take into account recent 
theoretical reasoning in political science which touches upon the necessity 
to adapt integration theories to possible scenarios of disintegration. 
Amongst these, Ben Rosamond and Philippe C. Schmitter, as an early 
advocate of Neofunctionalism, stand out as the most prominent voices.  
1.  Neofunctionalism and the concept of ‘spillover’  
a)  Functional spillover  
A central precondition for the development of functional pressures is the 
interdependence of one policy field with a neighboring sector. As the 
pioneer of Neofunctionalism, German-American scholar Ernst Bernard 
Haas, observed in his landmark study “The Uniting of Europe” in 1958 
individual sectors and issues tend to be so interdependent in modern 
polities and economies that it is difficult to isolate them from the rest.2 
Originally, Neofunctionalism assumed that ‘spillovers’ occur “[...]quasi-
automatically as demands for additional central services 
intensified[...]” 3 when the supranational authority was not sufficiently 
endowed with powers to meet the rising demands of member states and 
interest groups. Haas himself conceded in 1975 that his initial assumption 
of automaticity in the process of integration had been unrealistic. This 
needed correction has however not rendered Neofunctionalism obsolete as 
 
2  See Haas, Ernst Bernard (1958) The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and 
Economic Forces, 1950-1957, Stanford University Press, Stanford, p. 297.  
3  Ibid. (2004) ibid., University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, New edition, p. 
xv.  
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Haas suspected – a statement he revoked in his final book published after 
his passing in 2004.4 Bidding farewell indeed turned out to be premature as 
the concept of Neofunctionalism was repeatedly adapted in times of bigger 
and lesser acceptance of European integration. The main evolution was to 
introduce the concept of ‘agency’ in which various actors compete for the 
functional distribution of scarce public goods provided by a regional 
institution. 5  With the incorporation of this theoretical update, 
Neofunctionalism no longer assumed that policymakers and interest groups 
would necessarily devolve more powers to the supranational stage in a 
linear, progressive way. As Ben Rosamond asserts for the evolution of 
research in Neofunctionalism, a “retreat from functional automaticity” has 
come about. 6  Neofunctionalism was thus able to explain deviating 
outcomes of intergovernmental bargaining, sometimes culminating in 
nationalism (e.g. the ‘empty chair crisis’ caused by French President 
Charles de Gaulle). To put it simply, functional thinking is only as strong 
as it is perceived by the relevant actors.7  
Furthermore, unforeseen external events can serve as exogenous shocks, 
having a mixed impact on the pressures member states are facing. As one 
of the implicit hypotheses of Neofunctionalism, these type of shocks may – 
according to Schmitter – present a source of internal conflict within a trans-
national regional organization as they do not necessarily possess the 
cyclical qualities known from endogenous ones.8 
  
 
4  See ibid.   
5  See Schmitter, Philippe C. (2015) ”Neo-Functionalism as a Theory of 
Disintegration”, Paper prepared for ‘European Disintegration – A Blind Spot of 
Integration Theory?’22nd CES Conference, Paris July 8-10, 2015, p. 2, retrieved 
from http://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/SPS/Profiles/Schmitter/ 
Neo-F-Disintegration.final.pdf (last accessed: 26th of April 2017).  
6  See Rosamond, Ben (2000) Theories of European Integration, The European Union 
Series, Palgrave, London,  p. 63.  
7  See Niemann, Arne/Ioannou, Demosthenes, “European economic integration in 
times of crisis: a case of neofunctionalism?”, in: Journal of European Public Policy, 
Vol. 22 (2015) Iss. 2, pp. 196-218, 201.  
8  See Schmitter (2015), p. 9.  
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b)  Political spillover  
The growth of authority at the supranational level occurs as a long-term 
consequence of incremental economic integration. In this understanding 
political spillover and integration thus take place as an inevitable side-
effect.9 However purposeful, interest-driven institutional actors enter the 
game and act as political sponsors of integration. According to Joseph Nye, 
policymakers who internalized the logic of ‘spillover’ have likely 
discovered “the inherent linkage of tasks”10. National and regional elites 
come to realize that problems of paramount interest cannot be effectively 
tackled at the domestic level only.11 As a consequence, benefits in one 
policy sector ‘a’ can only be reaped and retained when linking it to 
thematically adjacent ‘sectors b’ and ‘c’. This should trigger a learning 
process which in Haas’ thinking will ultimately lead elites “to shift their 
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center”12, for 
example a European high authority. More recent works on the 
neofunctionalist theory, as put forward by Ben Rosamond, tend to agree 
that the process of loyalty transference is crucial for understanding the 
propositions made by Haas.13 Haas himself called for a careful look on the 
nature of the loyalty held by actors. If governmental decision-makers or 
national interest groups block a specific integrative step in the short-term, a 
permanent realignment of political loyalties to a supranational center could 
still happen under the condition that actors hold long-range expectations 
(e.g. business opportunities or political gains) with a pivot to ‘Europe’.14 
However, this process may come to a halt, possibly increasing the potential 
for conflict on the path to integration, if the aims of political and non-
governmental elites diverge. 15  To counter or circumvent resistance to 
integration, like-minded actors can employ a number of different strategies 
 
9  See Rosamond (2000), p. 52.  
10  Nye, Joseph Samuel, “Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist 
Model”, in: International Organization Vol. 24 (1970) Iss. 4, pp. 796-835. p. 804.  
11  See Nieman / Ioannou (2015), p. 6.  
12  Haas(2004), p. 16.  
13  Rosamond (2000), p. 65.  
14  See Haas (2004), p. 293.  
15  See Rosamond (2000), p. 67.  
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for creating functional pressures as Philippe C. Schmitter – an early 
proponent of Neofunctionalism – has set out as displayed in table 1:16  
Schmitter deserves credit for the fact that with this typology employed 
Neofunctionalism can encompass policies which go beyond the ‘spillover-
logic’. These strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive but rather 
complementary. Most importantly, they may serve to promote goals in 
integration even if they imply an apparent backtracking on pro-integration 
commitments.  
Strategy Definition 
Spill-over 
 
Regional processes dispose national actors to resolve 
their inevitable dissatisfactions by increasing both the 
level and the scope of common institutions.    
Spill-around 
 
The proliferation of functionally specialized, 
independent, but strictly intergovernmental 
organizations. 
Institutional 
build-up 
 
Agree to increase the decisional autonomy or capacity 
of joint institutions, but deny them entrance into new 
issue areas. 
Retrench 
 
Increase the level of joint deliberation, but withdraw 
the institutions.  
Muddle-about 
 
Let the regional bureaucrats debate. Suggest and 
expostulate on a variety of issues, but decrease their 
actual capacity to allocate values.  
(Disintegrative) 
spill-back  
 
Retreat on level and scope of authority, perhaps 
returning to the status quo prior to initiation of 
integration.  
Encapsulate Respond to crisis by marginal modifications. 
Table 1: Own compilation of actor strategies; sources: Philippe Schmitter (2003, see fn. 
17) and Ben Rosamond (2000, see fn.7). 
 
16  Schmitter, Philippe C. (2003) ”Neo-Neo-Functionalism”, in: Wiener, Antje and 
Diez, Thomas (eds.) – European Integration Theory , Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, retrieved from http://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/SPS 
/Profiles/Schmitter/NeoNeoFunctionalismRev.pdf (last accessed 31st of March 
2017). 
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c)  Institutional spillover  
In terms of explaining the creation of new institutions, Neofunctionalism 
borrows its logic from David Mitrany’s classic Functionalism to the extent 
that the institutional form of policy-making follows its function. Through 
the lenses of Neofunctionalism, institutional build-up can be seen as a 
product of increased complex interdependencies causing functional 
pressures for policymakers to act. Supranational institutions develop a life 
of their own in order to secure the benefits they take from the integration 
process. They can be constrained by those who build them, not controlled 
in their entirety. 17  This makes them capable of promoting agreements 
which go beyond the lowest common denominator between nation states. 
Beyond this, trans-national regional organizations may take the European 
Union both as a conceptual model and a normative engine. The EU often 
attempts to proliferate the building of new institutions to expand its own 
values and practices.18  
2.  Functional Spillover and the Gas Crises in 2006/2009   
Unfortunately, neofunctionalist literature only offers few insights as to how 
exogenous shocks effect EU integration, while endogenous crises have 
been widely theorized. As a notable exception, Philippe C. Schmitter 
argues that in contrast to the usual cyclical qualities of endogenous shocks, 
exogenous ones – in the neofunctionalist logic – are likely to have a 
differential impact upon member states. He finds their long-term effect to 
be conditional on the institutional capacity of the trans-national regional 
organization (TRO), for instance the European Commission. 19 
Complicating matters further, member states and their pertinent TRO might 
be dependent on the cooperative behavior of a third country for 
deescalating a disturbance.20 The gas crises of 2006 and 2009 have attested 
to the relevance of including the aspect of ‘exogenous shocks’ to 
 
17  See Nieman / Ioannou (2015), p. 6. 
18  See Kühnhardt, Ludger (2010) Region-Building. Vol. I: The Global Proliferation of 
Regional Integration, Berghahn Books, New York/Oxford.  
19  See Schmitter (2015), p. 9.  
20  See Schmitter (2015), p. 9.  
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neofunctionalist reasoning as parameters for evaluating the impact of the 
EU’s gas supply vulnerability on the integration process in a larger context. 
As compared to Gazprom’s behavior in the 1990s, the above-mentioned 
disruptions have reflected a more general trend of the 2000s towards less 
diplomatic conduct as the monopoly has denied extra gas deliveries to 
Central and Western European states in the event of transit diversions by 
Western CIS countries like Ukraine.21 Energy policy was used as leverage 
for political bargaining and created functional pressures for the EU to 
counteract the Russian display of dominance. As for Ukraine, EU 
policymakers have had to strike a difficult balance between reassessing the 
reliability of the country as a transit partner and protecting it from Russian 
pressure. The following section spells out the policy implications of the 
2006 and 2009 exogenous shocks. 
a)  The gas crisis in 2006 
On the 1st of January 2006 Gazprom suspended all gas supplies to Ukraine, 
following Ukraine’s refusal to sign a renewed supply contract which would 
have envisaged a significant price rise. Despite this, Russia did not 
terminate supplies across Ukraine. Nevertheless, contract partners from the 
EU reported a decline in deliveries.22 At the proposal of Russia, the EU-
Russia Energy Dialogue in October 2007 introduced an ‘Early Warning 
Mechanism’23 to mitigate the impact of future supply disruptions in gas and 
oil on Russia and the EU.24 Signed by the coordinators of the Dialogue, 
Sergei Ivanovich Shmatkó, the Minister of Energy of the Russian 
 
21  See Yafimava, Katja (2011) The Transit Dimension of EU Energy Security: 
Russian Gas Transit Across Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, p. 81.  
22  According to Yafimava the reported loss of deliveries varied between 14 and 40 per 
cent for individual EU member states, p. 82.  
23  European Commission (2009) “Memorandum on an Early Warning Mechanism in 
the Energy Sector within the Framework of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue”, 
retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2009_11_16_ 
ewm_signed_en_0.pdf (last accessed: 17th of April 2017).  
24  See Bilefsky, Dan, “Russia to soften EU worries of gas supply crisis with new alert 
system”, 22nd of October 2007, in: The International Herald Tribune, retrieved 
from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/22/business/worldbusiness/22iht-union. 
4.8001462.html (last accessed 14th of March 2017).   
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Federation and Andris Piebalgs, former EU Commissioner for Energy, the 
rapid alert system includes a special telephone hotline between designated 
persons in the Kremlin and Brussels, raising the profile of the Commission 
in external energy policy. If an ‘emergency situation’ occurs, the Energy 
Commissioner along with its Russian counterpart is allowed to appoint a 
‘Special Monitoring Group’ to do fact-finding. Even though the reach of its 
competences is not clearly spelled out, the Memorandum on the Warning 
Mechanism has increased the decisional autonomy of the Commission and 
represents a case of ‘institutional build-up’ in line with neofunctionalist 
theory.  
b) The gas crisis in 2009  
Despite the monitoring mission being in place, the 11 days of dramatic gas 
supply disruption in January 2009 proved the failure of the mutual alert 
system, leaving large parts of Central Eastern Europe in the cold. The most 
viable opportunity for supranational action was missed and the lack of 
emergency infrastructure to secure reverse gas flows in the EU became 
evident. The concept of solidarity between EU countries - as set out by the 
Commission’s Second Strategic Energy Review in 2008 - failed to work as 
planned as the gas interconnection facilities for transmission across 
member states were only in their early stages.25 Hence, due to a preliminary 
lack of gas infrastructure and associated supranational oversight, there was 
no way for the Commission to effectively intervene and alleviate the 
symptoms of the crisis. Due to this lack of a clear mandate, functional 
pressures did not lead to a spillover of gas security policies from the 
member states to the ‘High Authority’ in Brussels. Russia furthermore 
denied Ukraine’s request of letting the Commission participate in dispute 
settlement negotiations.26 
 
25  See European Commission (2008) “Second Strategic Energy Review. An EU 
Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan”, Communication, 13th of November 
2008, COM (2008) 781 final, retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0781:FIN:EN:PDF (last 
accessed 14th of March 2017).  
26  Yafimava (2011), p. 88.  
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Prior to the outbreak of the crisis, the Commission missed the opportunity 
to honor its prerogatives. It possessed useful tools – within the Energy 
Charter, the EU-Russia and the EU-Ukraine Energy Dialogues – to insist 
on greater transparency of commercial contracts as well as on proper 
metering of supply and transit flows on the Russia-Ukraine and the 
Ukraine-EU border.27 As a consequence, it could not credibly place the 
exclusive blame on the Russian or Ukrainian governments. The January 
2009 supply disruption was the first ‘transit crisis’ to which the tenth Joint 
Progress Report of the Dialogue explicitly referred, going beyond the 
allusions made in the 2007 report.28 Unfortunately, this JPR declared that 
“a legally binding international mechanism for dealing with emergencies in 
the field of energy does not exist”.29 The mere labeling of a ‘transit crisis’ 
rather conceals Gazprom’s irresponsible conduct as the first item in the 
supply chain. Though, Yafimava correctly points to the fact that the 
report’s acknowledgement further undermines the legal standing of the 
multilateral Energy Charter Treaty as an international transit dispute 
prevention and resolution mechanism to which both the EU and Russia had 
previously committed themselves.30 What becomes evident here too, is that 
national energy policymakers in the EU in this situation retreated from the 
provisions stipulated by the ECT. By not adhering to them, they have 
claimed back authority. At the same time, they have set a negative 
precedent as this competence which had once been allocated to a 
multilateral ECT regime ‘spilled back’ to the national level. 
What is more, as Richter and Holz note that the EU has not yet exhausted 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) resources as a key component to achieving 
source diversification and to ultimately replacing Russian pipeline gas.31 
This would allow customers in the EU to fill up their gas storages 
throughout the year. Originally, with an exclusive reliance on pipeline-
pumped natural gas, this refill can only be conducted in the summer months 
 
27  Ibid.  
28  Ibid., p. 59. 
29  Ibid., p. 60.  
30  Ibid.  
31  See ibid., p. 187.  
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in which consumption is usually low. However, a large part of the 
European LNG import capacity is not well connected to the Internal Energy 
Market. Despite lower pipeline supplies in the Baltics, Finland and other 
East European countries, aggregate EU regasification capacity is only 
partially used.32 The example of unused LNG capacities prove that despite 
existing functional pressures the national sovereignty of determining the 
structure of energy supplies has only spilled over to the EU level to a 
limited degree. Paradoxically the Visegrád states Hungary and Slovakia 
have been most hesitant even though pooled EU powers would reduce their 
vulnerability to short-term disruptions and increase their strategic clout. 
This restrained behavior by some member states points to the 
intergovernmental heritage of EU external energy relations. Whether this is 
baggage to bear for the neofunctionalist integration logic in gas security 
will be elaborated in the following section.         
3.  Political Spillovers  
The state-to-state nature of contractual gas delivery commitments cannot 
conceal the fact that until the fall of the Iron Curtain, the long-term 
convergence of state preferences has manifested itself most clearly in the 
common desire to increase interdependence with Russia by building 
common projects such as the MEGAL-Pipeline across former 
Czechoslovakia in the 1970s. After NATO’s and the EU’s eastward 
enlargement in 2004/07/08, the widespread European desire for 
interdependence with Russia has become less consensual, sometimes 
culminating in the wish for independence from Gazprom’s natural gas tap.  
a)  Spillovers from “Unintended Consequences”      
Against this backdrop of more divergent state preferences, it can be seen as 
a major leap forward that the EU Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger 
in May 2014 was given a robust mandate for holding trilateral gas talks 
between the European Union, Ukraine and Russia after Gazprom in April 
cancelled Ukraine's natural gas discount as agreed to in the 17 December 
 
32  See ibid., p. 187.  
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2013 Ukrainian–Russian action plan because its debt to the exporter had 
risen to 1.7 billion USD since 2013.33 The fact that the Russian government 
annulled an export-duty exemption for Gazprom, in place since the 2010, 
which led to an immediate price hike from 413 to 485 $ per 1,000 cubic 
meters for Ukraine’s state company Naftogaz, complicated Oettinger’s 
brokerage role even more. Eventually, on the 30th of October 2014 a 
compromise deal was reached which featured two components: First, 
Ukraine agreed to pay 378 $ in advance per 1,000 cubic metres to the end 
of 2014, and 365 $ in the first quarter (ending on 31 March) of 2015. 
Second, Russia consented to partially prolonging the term of maturity for 
Ukrainian debt. On top of that, the European Union declared it would act as 
a guarantor for Ukraine's gas purchases from Russia and would help meet 
outstanding debts (using funds from existing accords with the European 
Union and IMF).34 
The Commission’s role as a broker in the trilateral gas talks has 
substantially increased the EU’s supranational reach of action in gas policy 
as it for the first time entered the uncharted territory of country to country 
gas contracts mediating on behalf of EU countries and customers. Even 
though intergovernmental gas delivery agreements (IGAs) do not foresee 
an enhanced role for the Commission, supranationalism has crept in 
through the backdoor. Thereby confirming the neofunctionalist assessment 
that integrationist progress can occur as an ‘unintended consequence’. The 
inception of the trilateral talks under the political leadership of the 
Commission has increased its scope of authority and can therefore serve as 
an example of a successful “spill-around”-strategy.  
 
33  See BBC, “Ukraine crisis: Russia halts gas supplies to Kiev”, 16th of June 2014, 
retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27862849 (last accessed: 
28th April 2017); see also Mazneva, Elena, “Gazprom Raises Gas Export Price as 
Ukraine Looks for Cash”, Bloomberg, 1st of April 2014, retrieved from 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-01/gazprom-raises-gas-export-
price-as-ukraine-looks-for-cash (last accessed: 28th of April 2017).  
34  See BBC, “Russia-Ukraine gas deal secures EU winter supply”, 31st of October 
2014, retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/business-29842505 (last accessed: 
28th of April 2017).  
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Consistent with the ‘spill-around’-argument, the Commission in April 2015 
sent a Statement of Objections to Gazprom alleging that export ban clauses, 
destination clauses and other measures that prevent the cross-border flow 
of gas in Europe, constitute an abuse of its dominant market position in 
Central Eastern Europe in breach of EU antitrust rules. By prohibiting 
provisions that required the wholesaler to use the purchased gas in its own 
country only, ‘Brussels’ once again intervened in the country-to-country 
sphere of gas contracts, thereby strengthening the ‘Energy Union’ for the 
event of supply shortfalls.  
b)  Spillovers from Inter-EU Diversification: The Energy Union   
A geopolitical challenge, yet also a chance for a comeback of 
neofunctionalist integration strategies have been the Russian annexation of 
the Ukrainian territory of Crimea on the 18th of March 2014 and the 
ongoing conflict in the Donbass region. Both have raised alarm bells in EU 
capitals as Europe’s main supplier and key transit country have become 
war parties, putting the predictability of gas supply from Russia into 
question. Politically motivated disruptions or acts of sabotage became 
genuine risks. Due to this external shock, a higher degree of internal 
‘practical solidarity’ between member states became a strategically 
compelling argument materializing in the Framework Strategy for a 
Resilient Energy Union 35  published by the Commission on the 25th of 
February 2015. The core concept behind this strategy originates in the 
vision of Jerzy Buzek and Jacques Delors for a European Energy 
Community in 2010.36 As for the 2015 policy proposal, it has not only 
underlined the need for a build-up of effective reverse flow capacity to 
 
35  European Commission (2015) “Energy Union Package. A Framework Strategy for 
a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy”, 
Communication, COM(2015) 80 final, retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:1bd46c90-bdd4-11e4-bbe1-01aa75ed71a1. 
0001.03/DOC_1&format=PDF (last accessed: 28th of April 2017). 
36  The term “European Energy Community” should not be confused with the Energy 
Community institution designed to approximate the EU’s neighborhood; Buzek, 
Jerzy / Delors, Jacques, “Towards a new European Energy Community”, Brussels, 
5th of May 2010, retrieved from http://www.institutdelors.eu/media/en_buzek-
delors_declaration.pdf?pdf=ok (last accessed 3rd of April 2017).  
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cushion possible supply disruptions in the most vulnerable European 
countries, it has also set off a spillover process which led one year later to 
reform proposals labelled the “Sustainable Energy Security Package” – an 
overhaul of large chunks of energy legislation. 37  This way, Energy 
Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker have articulated their claim to set the agenda. In this context, 
tangible results have been brought about: On the 27th of April 2017, the 
Council and the European Parliament struck a provisional agreement on the 
Commission’s proposal for a revised Regulation to safeguard the security 
of gas supply which forms a key element of the Energy Union strategy. 
According to the European Parliament, the draft agreement stipulates four 
“risk groups” of member states for obligatory “risk associated 
cooperation”, for joint risk assessment and joint establishment of 
mandatory preventive and emergency measures. These replace the seven 
regional cooperation groups listed in the initial legislative proposal. There 
will be three energy supply crisis levels that member states can declare by 
informing the Commission and the competent authorities in their risk 
groups and in directly connected member states: early warning, alert, and 
emergency. According to the preliminary text, the solidarity mechanism 
will be invoked when a member state judges a cross-border intervention to 
be necessary for tackling a severe crisis. This can happen only if there is a 
security or health risk for the so-called “solidarity protected consumers”, 
e.g. a household, a district heating installation or an essential social 
service.38 According to Jerzy Buzek (EPP), the Chief Rapporteur of the bill, 
“member states are obliged to help each other when there is a danger to the 
 
37  See European Commission (2016) “Towards Energy Union: The Commission 
presents sustainable energy security package”, press release, 16th of February 2016, 
retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-307_en.htm (last 
accessed: 28th of April 2017).  
38 See European Parliament (2017) “Security of gas supply through solidarity: EP and 
Council strike a deal”, press release, 27th of April 2017, retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20170426IPR72442/security-
of-gas-supply-through-solidarity-ep-and-council-strike-a-deal (last accessed: 3rd of 
May 2017). 
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supply of gas to the most sensitive consumers – private households, 
hospitals, social services”.39   
To accelerate the interconnectivity of gas supply infrastructure in Central 
and South Eastern Europe, the EU, a number of its member states40 and six 
Energy Community Contracting Parties 41  have set up a High Level 
Working Group (CESEC)42. Launched as an expert group with substantial 
discretion to influence legislation in gas security, stakeholders have 
managed to amplify the reach to the electricity sector, renewable energies 
and energy efficiency in 2016. 43  This expansive procedure once again 
underlines Joseph Nye’s dictum of inherently linked political tasks.  
Despite this incremental integrationist progress, the EU Commission’s 
hands-on response to energy security challenges posed by the conflict in 
Ukraine was not backed by all member states in the recent past. Hungary, 
from September 2014 to January 2015 – most likely pressured by the 
Kremlin – stopped gas deliveries to Ukraine, a member of the Energy 
Community, when the conflict escalated most, thereby undermining the 
EU’s credibility as a reliable partner.44 While Hungary (HU) has resumed 
 
39  Ibid.  
40  Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
41  Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Serbia, FYROM, Albania and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
42  See European Commission (2017) “Central and South Eastern Europe Gas 
Connectivity”, retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/ 
 central-and-south-eastern-europe-gas-connectivity (last accessed: 29th of April 
2017).  
43  See European Commission (2016) “Expanding CESEC into Electricity, Renewable 
Energy and Energy Efficiency”, CESEC New Horizons Non-Paper, retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/CESEC%20new%20horizon
s%20non%20paper%20-%20FINAL.pdf (last accessed: 29th of April 2017).  
44  See Stüwe, Robert (2016) “The EU Commission’s Energy Security Package: A  
Challenge To Russia’s Gas Dominance?”, ZEI Insight, No. 37, April 2016, 
retrieved from https://www.zei.uni-bonn.de/dateien/zei-insights/stuewe_37-1; see 
also Financial Times, “Hungary halts flow of gas to Ukraine”, 26th of September 
2014, retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/7c5d2bf0-4552-11e4-ab86-
00144feabdc0 (both last accessed: 29th of April 2017).   
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reverse flows to Ukraine (Ukr)45 and has secured an EU-backed capacity 
upgrade for the HU-Ukr-Interconnector by 6.1 bcm /year46, the German-
backed Nord Stream 2 pipeline 47 , which creates more directly linked 
delivery capacity for West Siberian gas, could pose a long-term risk. It 
could trigger a spill-back process in energy policy integration as Russia 
could try to limit the gas amounts being pumped to the EU market to such a 
level that would not allow EU member states to provide emergency supply 
to Ukraine in the event of a crisis, thus making EU commitments merely 
declaratory. To avert such a scenario, Kai-Olaf Lang and Kirsten Westphal 
from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) 
argue that the EU should seek a trilateral agreement with Russia and 
Ukraine in order to maintain gas transit across Ukraine as an option of 
flexibility.48 This would avoid a complete fall-out of the Ukraine transit 
route through the Brotherhood Pipeline after 2019, back up the EU’s 
commitment to the war-torn country and save the Energy Union.  
Despite these risks, the negative implications of the expiring Russian-
Ukrainian contractual relationship on neofunctionalist EU energy 
integration should not be overestimated. As Richter and Holz set out, the 
European supply situation, regulation and infrastructure have improved 
 
45  See Budapest Business Journal, “Ukraine received gas from Hungary ahead of halt 
from Russia”, 1st of July 2015, retrieved from http://bbj.hu/economy/ukraine-
received-gas-from-hungary-ahead-of-halt-from-russia_100164 (last accessed: 29th 
of April 2017).  
46  European Commission (2016) “Central and South Eastern European Gas 
Connectivity (CESEC) High Level Group”, Indicative project - specific information 
(last updated November 2016, p. 10, retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/ 
energy/sites/ener/files/documents/monitoring_data_on_cesec_projects_november_2
016.pdf (last accessed: 29th of April 2017).  
47  Nord Stream 2 has an annual capacity of up to 55 billion cubic meters per year and 
will deliver gas to Europe from the natural gas field Bovanenkovo in North 
Russia’s Yamal Peninsula, which holds some 4.9 trillion cubic meters of gas 
reserves (twice as much gas as the total proven reserves of the EU 1.9 trillion). 
After its starting point in Russia, Nord Stream 2 crosses offshore the Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZs) of Finland, Sweden and Denmark before arriving in 
Lubmin, Germany. 
48  See Lang, Kai-Olaf / Westphal, Kirsten (2016) Nord Stream 2 – Versuch einer 
politischen und wirtschaftlichen Einordnung, SWP-Studie, Berlin, p. 6.  
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since 2009.49 Most importantly, the Energy Union as a product of political 
spillover provides a strong impetus for overcoming the so-called ‘energy 
paradox’, which assumes that the EU was built around Energy (ECSC and 
EURATOM) yet sixty years later lacks a common external energy policy.50  
c)  Spillovers from External Diversification   
As it is far from certain whether the Commission will be needed as a 
conflict mediator between Ukraine and Russia for the long-term, the key 
focal point of pro-integration policies should be external diversification. 
This is mainly due to the observation that Ukraine’s significance as a 
transit country for gas deliveries will diminish by the time the Russian 
strategic shift of transit diversification to Turkey (Turkish Stream 
Pipeline), the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea (Nord Stream 2) will fully 
materialize. As for the Kremlin’s geopolitical zone of influence, the 
Commission’s prerogatives gained through a ‘political spillover’ process in 
the course of the trilateral talks might not be sustainable.  
Encouraged by the staunchest proponents of a gas supply reduction from 
Russia – Poland and the Baltic states – the EU Commission has embarked 
upon the Southern Gas Corridor for external source diversification. As the 
most prominent import pipeline – to be operational by 2020 – it is supposed 
to connect the EU to the Shah Deniz 2- gas field located in the Caspian Sea 
in Azerbaijan and at a later point to other Central Asian producers, 
bypassing Russian territory. The total length of the Corridor will be 3.500 
kilometers and comprise three route sections: the South Caucasus Pipeline 
from Baku to Erzurum in Turkey, the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) 
reaching until the Greek border and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) 
transporting the gas across Greece, Albania and the Adriatic Sea to Italy. 
 
49  See Richter, Philipp M. / Holz, Franziska, “All quiet on the eastern front? 
Disruption scenarios of Russian natural gas supply to Europe, in: Energy Policy”, 
Vol. 80 (2015), pp. 177–189, 177.  
50  See Belyi, Andrei V. (2008) “EU External Energy Policies: A Paradox of 
Integration”, in: Orbie, Jan (ed), Europe’s Global Role. External Policies of the 
European Union, Routledge, Ashgate, pp. 203-217, 203; see also Panayotopoulos, 
Thomas (2015) The Energy Union – a solution for the European energy security? 
ZEI Discussion Paper C230, University of Bonn, p. 1.  
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The total capacity of gas to be carried is estimated at 16 billion cubic 
meters per year. A share of 6 bcm/y is already contracted for sale to 
Turkey, while the remaining 10 bcm/y will be sold in the EU. 51  This 
volume is lower than the one envisaged for the failed EU-backed Nabucco 
Pipeline which was expected to transport 31 bcm/y to the Union. To reach 
this capacity and ultimately bring about the desired diversification results, 
investors to the SGC would have to build additional infrastructure for 
connecting the Corridor to Turkmenistan and Iran.52 This expansion might 
cause a geopolitical competition for gas resources with China and Russia – 
a prospect which does not necessarily speak against the construction of the 
SGC, as gas pipelines in the past have regularly been subject to power 
politics. Furthermore, the existence of armed conflicts along the SGC 
pipelines’ planned trajectory – such as in the Nagorno-Karabakh region and 
the clashes between Kurds and the Turkish state – cannot trump the 
strategic necessity of the Corridor for source and route diversification. 
From a pro-integration logic, the SGC might even serve to approximate 
Georgia as a key transit country closer to the EU, thereby re-energizing 
Europe’s claim to be a normative power. It has to be conceded though that 
partnerships with authoritarian regimes in the context of the SGC might in 
the long-term endanger the European self-perception of being a norm-
oriented role model. 53  This is a dilemma, the EU can hardly escape. 
Instead, the EU should adhere to the logic of spillover and build resilience 
against external supply shocks by finalizing the Energy Union. In this 
context, facilitating pipeline interconnectors in the framework of the 
Projects of Common Interest (PCI) and the Connecting Europe Facility best 
promotes the neofunctionalist prescription of creating interstate linkages. 
As Weiner observes, six new gas interconnections (the Czech-Polish 
STORK, the “German-Czech-German” Gazelle, the Hungarian-Romanian, 
 
51  See Siddi, Marco (2017) “The Southern Gas Corridor. Challenges to a Geopolitical 
Approach in the EU’s External Energy Policy”, FIIA Briefing Paper 216, p. 4, 
retrieved from http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/662/the_southern_gas_corridor/ 
(last accessed: 13th of April 2017).  
52  See ibid.  
53  See ibid., p. 7. 
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the Hungarian-Croatian, the Hungarian-Slovakian and the Romanian-
Moldovian) have been completed since the January 2009 gas crisis.54    
As for the area of regulation, the political goal of external diversification 
might be at odds with the legal obligations of the Commission. The fact 
that both Russia and Azerbaijan aspire to deliver gas to the EU through 
Greece – Gazprom via the planned Turkish Stream Pipeline, SOCAR, the 
state-owned gas producer from Azerbaijan via the EU-favored Trans 
Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)55 – will soon put the EU’s political commitments 
to the test as both companies mentioned will compete for the use of 
network capacity in the Hellenic Republic. This requires a consistent 
application of the legislative Third Energy Package by the Commission. 
Adopted in 2009, it stipulates the provisions that a company’s generation 
operations need to be separated from its transmission networks. 56  The 
challenge will be to create a level-playing field as SOCAR intends to 
acquire the Greek grid operator DESFA57 and Gazprom considers to use 
the TAP on Greek soil as a transit pipeline for its own gas deliveries to 
Central and Western Europe58. As SOCAR holds at least 20 per cent of the 
TAP pipeline’s shares, it would likely be in a position to make fair access 
to the Greek grid for Gazprom harder.  
 
54  See Weiner, Csaba (2016) “Central and East European Diversification under new 
Gas Market Conditions”, Working Paper 221, Centre for Economic and Regional 
Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences – Institute of World Economics, p. 
37, retrieved from http://real.mtak.hu/33784/1/WP_221_Weiner.pdf (last accessed: 
13th of April 2017).  
55  The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) will be part of the planned Southern Gas 
Corridor which is built to ship gas from Azerbaijan to the EU.  
56  Koenig, Christian/Kühling, Jürgen/Rasbach, Winfried (2013) Energierecht, Nomos 
UTB, 3rd ed., p. 141 ff.  
57  See Kathimerini, “Socar wants lower price for greek gas grid-deal”, 5th of 
September 2016, retrieved from http://www.ekathimerini.com/211758/article/ 
ekathimerini/business/socar-wants-lower-price-for-greek-gas-grid-deal  
(last accessed: 28th of April 2017).  
58  See Roberts, John/Powell, William, “Gazprom Eyes TAP for Russian Gas”, Natural 
Gas World, 24th of January 2017, retrieved from 
http://www.naturalgasworld.com/gazprom-eyes-tap-for-russian-gas-35548 (last 
accessed: 20th of March 2017).  
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The example of the Greek gas network illustrates that the Commission 
needs to grant fair access to the EU Internal Market to ALL licensed gas 
suppliers irrespective of the political goals of supply and route 
diversification which member states have subscribed to. To put it simply, 
following through on EU Competition Law and Regulation may eventually 
lead to higher volumes in Russian gas on EU markets. This probable result 
would be at odds with the Framework Strategy for the Energy Union and 
would contravene the logic of neofunctionalist integration of which the 
Energy Union is a product. It is truly paradoxical that by applying its core 
competence of ‘Competition Law’, the Commission can – as an unintended 
consequence in the words of Haas – undermine the key objective of 
external source diversification stipulated by the European Energy Security 
Strategy.59  
On the other hand, its established high profile in the interpretation of EU 
Competition Law can give the Commission’s soft power a “hard edge”60 
with which it can solidify political spillover for its own institutional 
advantage. Consequently, Aalto and Kormaz Temel rightly indicate that the 
full implementation of the Third Energy Package would steer the EU’s 
internal energy market towards a “convergent society”61, an institution with 
a higher degree of pooled resources. A case in point for this is the 
Commission’s Decision from the 5th of December 2013 against the 
Russian-sponsored South Stream62 Pipeline across the Black Sea, which 
effectively terminated the project, thereby contributing to physical 
infrastructure diversification in favor of the ‘Energy Union’. Specifically, 
 
59 See European Commission (2014) “European Energy Security Strategy”, 
Communication, {SWD (2014) 330 final}, retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&from=EN 
(last accessed: 28th of April 2017).  
60  See Goldthau, Andreas/Sitter, Nick, “Soft power with a hard edge: EU policy  tools 
and energy security”, in: Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 22, No. 5 
(2015), p. 941-965.   
61  Aalto, Pami/Kormaz Temel, Dicle, “European Energy Security: Natural Gas and 
the Integration Process”, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 52, No. 4 
(2014), p. 758-774, 770.  
62  South Stream would have shipped gas from Russia to Bulgaria with branches to 
Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Hungary. 
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the supranational authority put forward conditions which caused higher 
investment risks thus making the pipeline commercially and politically 
unviable. As justification, the Commission cited breaches of EU law in the 
Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) for the construction of the Black 
Sea pipeline Russia concluded with Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Greece, 
Slovenia, Croatia and Austria. According to the Decision, the IGAs 
violated the EU’s Third Energy Package as they would have given the 
state-owned Gazprom monopoly the status of generator AND owner63 of 
the transmission network. Without full ownership unbundling being 
implemented, Gazprom could have abused its dominant position – 
especially on Central Eastern European gas markets which are already 
highly dependent on Russian deliveries. Furthermore, Gazprom must not 
enjoy the exclusive right to access the pipeline and would have to enable 
non-discriminatory third-party-access. Third, the tariff structure for gas 
shipping was criticized by the Commission.64 
Despite member states and national energy industries have been closely 
involved in the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, the Commission used this 
platform for promoting its external diversification policies. It has over the 
years carved out an agenda-setter-role, authorizing strategic ‘Projects of 
Common Interest’ (PCI) 65  in transport infrastructure such as the Nord 
Stream 1 (route: Russia-Germany) and the Yamal-Europe 66  (Russia-
 
63  Note: up to the gas handover point in Bulgaria as the entrance to the EU’s Internal 
Market   
64  See Keating, Dave, “South Stream must be renegotiated – Commission”, Politico, 
5th of December 2013, retrieved from http://www.politico.eu/article/south-stream-
must-be-renegotiated-commission-3/ (last accessed: 28th of April 2017).  
65  After taking into account the comments of ACER (the Agency for the Cooperation 
of Energy Regulators), the member states together with the European Commission 
as the decision-making body decide upon the regional PCI lists. These regional lists 
are then combined to form a comprehensive Union-wide list to be adopted as a 
Delegated Act by the European Commission. Retrieved from Bundesnetzagentur 
https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/EN/General/Bundesnetzagentur/InternationalAc
tivities/ElectrictiyGas/PCI/pci-node.html;jsessionid= C1AAA6623789AF94 B9BB 
8875BFCDCCF3 (last accessed: 11th of April 2017). 
66  The Yamal-Europe-Pipeline is delivering natural gas from the Yamal Pensinula in 
Western Siberia across Belarus and Poland to Germany. Its construction was 
completed in 1999. Since 2006 it is running at full capacity, 33 billion cubic meters.    
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Belarus-Poland-Germany) pipelines in 2001. Nord Stream 1 67  does not 
diversify the sources of supply yet was declared to be a PCI as it has 
broadened the routes of natural gas to the EU. Prior to becoming 
operational, ca. 80 per cent of Russian gas exports were pumped through 
the Ukraine Corridor mainly built in the 1970s. PCIs are intended to help 
achieve the EU's energy policy objectives, such as the completion of the 
internal energy market and security of supply and are based on the EU 
Regulation No 347/2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy 
infrastructure (TEN-E Regulation)68, which has been in force since June 
2013. The Roadmap for EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050, put 
forward by Commissioner Oettinger and Russian Energy Minister 
Alexander Novak in 2013, underlined the EU’s aspiration of being an 
engine in energy integration.69 In so doing, the Commission tried to affix its 
stamp on the long-term direction of EU-Russia energy relations while 
being fully aware of its limited formal competences against the backdrop of 
continued state supremacy.   
The most notable recent example which validates the expansive logic of 
Neofunctionalism is the Decision on Energy Deals with Third Countries 
reached on the 21st of March 2017. The new information exchange 
mechanism requires member states to submit plans of closing an 
 
67  Nord Stream 1 is an offshore natural gas pipeline from Vyborg in the Russian 
Federation to Lubmin in Germany that is owned and operated by the Nord Stream 
AG. It can transport up to 55 bcm of natural gas a year. The project includes two 
parallel lines. The  twin-pipeline system already came on stream – the first line in 
November 2011 and the second in October 2012. At 1,222 kilometers in length, it is 
the longest sub-sea pipeline in the world. See https://www.ft.com/content/ 
51ea636e-0a14-11e1-8d46-00144feabdc0. 
68  Regulation (Eu) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
April 2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, retrieved from 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:115:0039:0075: 
en:PDF (last accessed: 11th of April 2017). 
69  See European Commission (2013) “Roadmap. EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 
2050”, retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/ 
2013_03_eu_russia_roadmap_2050_signed.pdf (last accessed: 29th of April 2017).  
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Intergovernmental Agreement 70 in gas and oil to the Commission for an 
ex-ante compatibility check with EU law before opening negotiations. 
Under the previous regime, employed since 2012, the Commission was 
only eligible to make an assessment after the IGA was signed (ex-post), 
deeming 17 out of 125 notified IGAs questionable. 71  As a result, the 
integration process in gas security has stalled as no member state is able to 
terminate or renegotiate a non-compliant IGA. This lack of enforcement 
provides the imminent risk of spill-back processes defying the EU energy 
acquis and diversification commitments.  
The controversial points which were raised in the Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure for the Decision on energy deals with third countries have 
revealed conflicting state preferences as to what the principle of 
subsidiarity (Art. 5 TEU) actually means. The Federal Council of Austria, 
the Portuguese and the Maltese Parliaments as well as the French Senate 
issued a “Reasoned Opinion on Subsidiarity” to voice their skepticism. 
Malta’s justification is particularly noteworthy as it even challenges the 
Commission’s basic arithmetic underpinning the Decision. It sets out that 6 
of 17 non-compliant IGAs are linked to the failed South Stream project and 
are not indicative of a failure to abide by EU law in general. Whereas only 
8.9 per cent of the total number of IGAs could be viewed as a source of 
concern from the supranational angle. As less encroaching tools, existing 
competition law and infringement provisions (e.g. Art. 258 TFEU) would 
have been sufficient for tackling non-compliant energy deals 72  instead. 
 
70  IGAs typically serve as a legal and political guarantee to European energy 
companies who intend to sign a commercial contract with a state-dominated 
supplier such as Gazprom. 
71  See European Commission (2016) “Report to the European Parliament, The 
Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on the application of 
the Decision 994/2012/EU establishing an information exchange mechanism on 
intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the 
field of energy”, 16th of February 2016, COM(2016) 54 final, p. 3.  
72  See European Parliament (2016)”Reasoned Opinion of the Maltese Parliament on 
Subsidiarity”, Committee on Legal Affairs, 13th of June 2016, p. 4, retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/parlements_natio
naux/com/2016/0053/MT_PARLIAMENT_AVIS-COM(2016)0053_EN.pdf (last 
accessed 28th of March 2017).  
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According to the Maltese, the mandatory ex-ante notification sought by the 
Decision Proposal would thus have violated the subsidiarity principle.  
The Maltese example touches upon the nature of gas as a commodity which 
is a regionally traded fuel pumped through landline pipelines crossing 
multiple borders. Therefore, it bears no wondering that states tend to be 
cautious of ceding powers to a supranational authority in Brussels. In the 
case of the 2016 IGA Decision, it is remarkable that no country that is 
totally dependent on Russian gas has filed a subsidiarity complaint to the 
European Parliament. The permissive consensus among Central Eastern 
European member states secured the passage of this bill, proving the 
prevalence of high functional pressures which eventually induce the need 
to tolerate spillover-based integration and to speak with one voice.73  
d)  Spillovers from interest group activity     
As Haas set out, Neofunctionalism has carried the assumptions of 
democratic pluralism over into the formulation of policy by disaggregating 
the state into its actor components.74 This implies that non-governmental 
actors who are interest-driven and embedded in a pluralistic discourse can 
act as pressure groups who shape the preferences of national states and 
supranational decision-makers. There are at least too spheres in which 
spillovers in the formulation of political interests can be observed: First, an 
organizational relocation to the EU level has taken place in the lobbying 
sphere of the natural gas sector. As the most important agent on the 
supranational level, the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Gas (ENTSOG) has pitched tent. According to its mission 
statement75, ENTSOG is an association of Europe's transmission system 
operators (TSOs) to facilitate and enhance cooperation between national 
gas transmission system operators (TSOs) across Europe to ensure the 
 
73  See Rompel, Susanne (2015) Eine Energieaußenpolitik für die Europäische Union. 
Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, Europäische Schriften (Vol. 95), Nomos, Baden-
Baden.  
74  Haas (2004), p. xiv.  
75  See European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (2017), 
“Mission”, retrieved from http://www.entsog.eu/mission (last accessed: 29th of 
April 2017).  
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development of a pan-European transmission system in line with European 
Union energy goals. It was created on the 1st of December 2009 by 31 
TSOs from 21 European countries, resting on the legal basis of the EU’s 
third legislative package on the gas and electricity markets. It enjoys a 
considerable degree of leverage over senior EU officials since it develops 
annual Summer and Winter Supply Outlooks, review projections for gas 
supply, demand and capacity as well as disruption scenarios for 
Commission-sponsored Stress Tests. Furthermore, ENTSOG is 
incorporated into high-level policy formulation; for instance into the Gas 
Coordination Group, a stakeholder body set up by the revised 2016 EU 
Security of Gas Supply Regulation to coordinate supply measures chaired 
by the Commission.  
Second, a striking form of spillover has occurred in the public discourse on 
some of the new pipeline projects. In corporate communication strategies 
the abstract category of “EU interests” is invoked as the major reference 
point for justifying the need for large gas infrastructure projects. Even in 
the case of the planned Nord Stream 2 pipeline – an undertaking to which 
the Commission has denied the status of being a “Project of Common 
Interest (PCI)” – operators embrace a pro-integrationist rhetoric to defend 
the claim of common benefits for all European consumers even though 
Nord Stream does not advance the agreed political goal of source 
diversification away from Russia. According to the Head of 
Communications of Nord Stream 2, Ulrich Lissek, the Commission needs 
to act as the guardian of the Treaties and not based on political sentiment.76  
It can be ascertained that both with regard to the articulation of economic 
and ideational interests, expanded transnational linkages are going to 
evolve in the foreseeable future due to the political incentives the revised 
2016 EU Security of Gas Supply Regulation provides. As an innovation, it 
includes a solidarity principle which gives priority to the support of 
 
76  See Lissek, Ulrich (2016) “Regulation of Nord Stream 2: Rule of law, equal 
treatment and due process – A view from the project developer”, CEPS 
Commentary, retrieved from https://www.ceps.eu/publications/regulation-nord-
stream-2-rule-law-equal-treatment-and-due-process-%E2%80%93-view-
project#_ftn3 (last accessed 3rd of April 2017).  
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households and essential social services during an emergency situation.77 
Furthermore, mandatory regional groupings of member states to organize 
preventive action as well as emergency plans devised to promote market-
based solutions to possible supply disruptions, will likely lead to deeper 
inter-regional cooperation among utility companies. Time will tell whether 
this proposed Europeanization will result in an integrative spillover. What 
is sure though, is that the enhanced role of interest groups affirms Haas’s 
dictum that agency takes the place of determinism.    
4.  Institutional spillover: The Energy Community  
Within the sphere of gas security policies, the EU Commission has sought 
to duplicate its structures in its neighborhood with the intention of boosting 
the snowball effect of spillover as a tool for building resilience against 
exogenous supply shortfalls. As a first tangible result, this objective has 
culminated in the foundation of the Energy Community. In October 2005 
the European Union and nine states or territories in South-Eastern Europe - 
Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, the FYR of 
Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and the United Nations Mission 
(UNMIK) on behalf of Kosovo - signed a multilateral treaty to establish an 
Energy Community (EnCT). This treaty is seen as the first legally-binding 
treaty between these countries after the Balkan wars of the 1990s and the 
culmination of the so-called Athens Process starting in 2002. 78  In the 
EnCT, the signatories committed themselves to establishing the legal 
foundation for an integrated and liberalized energy market in their states, 
adopting the EU energy acquis. The most recent members include Moldova 
 
77  Wilson, Alex, “New rules on security of gas supply”, Briefing EU Legislation in 
Progress, European Parliamentary Research Service, October 2016, retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/593487/EPRS_BRI(20
16)593487_EN.pdf (last accessed: 1st of April 2017).  
78  See Renner, Stephan, “The Energy Community of Southeast Europe: A 
neofunctionalist project of regional integration”, in: European Integration online 
Papers, Vol. 13 (2009), p. 1-21, 2.  
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(joined in 2010), Ukraine (in 2011) and Georgia (in 2017).79 By promoting 
the Energy Community, the EU intends to stimulate reforms in energy 
market integration.80 Modelled on the European Coal and Steel Community 
from the 1950s, the EU Commission deliberately used the neofunctionalist 
model of regional integration as a blueprint for the set-up of the EnCT.81 
Just as between France and Germany after the Second World War, the idea 
was to pacify the Yugoslav countries which had been at war after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Empire.82  
The EnCT has proven useful as a means for the EU to extend its legal and 
regulatory sub-space of the energy acquis, without extending the entire 
acquis, which is only possible through EU membership. 83  The goal of 
duplicating Union structures to the Western countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a vital interest for EU 
consumers, who cannot make a legal transit claim against a western CIS 
gas undertaking, as there is no contractual relationship.84 This example 
once again underlines the congruence between boosting spillover effects 
and economic policy interests of EU citizens. As a limitation to this 
assumption, it is argued nevertheless that the EnCT is in competition with 
the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue. 
With regard to the strategies of actors, the methods policymakers have 
employed are broadly reflected in the concept of spillover. They 
predominantly aim at enabling the spread of institutional capability to the 
Energy Community and its Contracting Parties: At the administrative level, 
the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the Energy 
Community Secretariat have signed an arrangement to enhance 
cooperation. ACER may request the support of the Secretariat in collecting 
 
79  See Energy Community (2017) “Parties”, retrieved from https://www.energy-
community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/ENERGY_COMMUNITY/Stakeh
olders/Parties (last accessed: 11th of April 2017).  
80  See Lang / Westphal (2016), p. 41.  
81  See Renner (2009), p. 7.  
82  See ibid. 
83  See Yafimava ( 2011), p. 65.  
84  See Yafimava (2011), p. 80.  
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market data and information for extending the coverage of its annual 
market monitoring report to the EnCT Contracting Parties. Exchange of 
expertise takes place via the participation of the Secretariat’s staff in the 
Agency’s working groups on electricity and gas as observers. Referring to 
the Energy Union Strategy, ACER Director Alberto Pototschnig indicated 
that the agreement would enhance the goal of extending the internal energy 
market to include the EU’s eastern neighbors.85   
At the political level, the Energy Community as the extension of EU 
institutions places its emphasis on regional cooperation – a goal which is 
prominently reflected in the energy acquis. Regional cooperation, though 
not an end in itself, aims to provide the EnCT’s members with a 
supranational practice room to enable institutional learning. This is why it 
is common to confer the Presidency of the Energy Community to an 
associated EU country and contracting party, for instance to Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 2016. This way, the EU escapes the trap of a top-down, 
paternalistic approach, and the Contracting Parties can develop a sense of 
ownership. As a substantial part of this strategy, two EU4ENERGY 
regional offices have been established in Tbilisi covering the South 
Caucasian countries of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to 
support the legislative and regulatory integration into the EU’s Energy 
Union, ultimately creating a level playing field for large infrastructure 
projects. The second regional office will be based in Kyiv and will be 
responsible of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine.86 
 
85  See Energy Community (2016) “The Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
and the Energy Community Secretariat sign cooperation agreement”, Press Release, 
15th of December 2016, retrieved from https://www.energy-
community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/NEWS/News_Details?p_new_id=
13643 (last accessed: 12th of April 2017).  
86  See Energy Community (2017) “European Union, Energy Community and the 
Ministry of Energy of Georgia mark the opening of EU4ENERGY regional office 
in Tbilisi to support energy reforms in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan”, Press 
Release, 10th of March 2017, retrieved from https://www.energy-
community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/DOCS/4580408/4A5F1CD5F8485
344E053C92FA8C014A0.pdf (last accessed: 12th of April 2017).  
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In line with the neofunctionalist notion of spillover, the EU Commission 
and likeminded energy stakeholders initiate integration attempts towards a 
partner country by placing a focus on technical cooperation first. Led by 
the intention of setting the preconditions for later political harmonization, 
the Energy Community tries to create a functioning downstream market 
first which involves the actual processing, selling and distribution of 
natural gas (and oil) based products. However, contrary to the somewhat 
schematic theoretical prescription, the Energy Community, in concert with 
the Commission, seize opportunity structures which can arise from 
Association Agreements, similar contractual commitments and a general 
integration-friendly stance. As for the latter, the example of the Georgian 
accession to the EnCT in 2017 is most remarkable.   
To conclude, the Energy Community follows the logic of spillover but is 
not necessarily underpinned by a political promise of EU membership. 
Implicitly, the Energy Community has thus become a strategic instrument 
for EU neighborhood policy. Classic sectoral integration via the Energy 
Community à la Schuman and Monnet is therefore hard to realize.  
5.  Conclusion: Chances for spillovers – Risk of spillbacks  
This paper has found that EU natural gas security policies follow to a large 
extent the theoretical concept of neofunctionalist integration. A snowball 
effect of common political and legislative commitments for harmonization 
of the EU’s external energy policy is gathering momentum. As a caveat, it 
has to be considered that the supremacy of EU policymaking continues to 
face the risk of ‘spilling back’ to traditional national patterns when 
confronted with a serious crisis. This affirms the theoretical revisit 
conducted by Ernst B. Haas that ‘spillover processes’ can “move toward 
and against integration”87.  
  
 
87 Haas (2004), p. xxiv.  
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Specifically, this study has identified the following pro-integration trends:  
1. Functional Spillover: The Decision on Energy Deals with Third 
Countries reached on the 21st of March 2017 validates the continued 
expansive logic of Neofunctionalism, proving the prevalence of high 
functional pressures on policymakers which eventually induce the need to 
tolerate spillover-based integration and to speak with one voice. As for the 
role of interest groups, an organizational relocation to the EU level has 
taken place in the lobbying sphere of the natural gas sector. Second, in 
corporate communication strategies the abstract category of “EU interests” 
is invoked as the major reference point for justifying the need for large gas 
infrastructure projects. The revised EU Security of Gas Supply Regulation 
will likely prompt utility companies to seek deeper inter-regional 
cooperation.  
2. Political Spillover: On the other hand, in the aftermath of the gas 
crises, the spillover logic has entered the arena of the EU-Russia Energy 
Dialogue. Despite not being a supply crisis, the outbreak of the conflict in 
Ukraine in 2014 can be viewed as a major turning point for gas security 
policies. As an exogenous shock, functional pressures for a higher internal 
‘practical solidarity’ between member states culminated in the Framework 
Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union causing additional legislative 
spillover measures for internal and external diversification measures. 
Amongst the ones targeting the domestic EU realm, the agreement on a 
revised Security of Gas Supply Regulation, which encompasses binding 
solidarity measures between member states based on risk categorization, 
can be viewed as substantial accomplishment. As for external source and 
route diversification, the EU Commission has reiterated its power of 
agenda-setting in the promotion of the Southern Gas Corridor to Azerbaijan 
by teaming up with likeminded member states.         
3. Institutional spillover has taken place in the creation of the Energy 
Community as the EU institutions deliberately used the European Coal and 
Steel Community from the 1950s as a template. Very much in line with the 
original understanding of Neofunctionalism, stakeholders initiate 
integration attempts towards a partner country by placing a focus on 
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technical cooperation first. Reiterating the relevance of interest-driven 
political actors vis-à-vis functional automaticity, stakeholders of the Energy 
Community seize opportunity structures which can arise from Association 
Agreements and similar contractual commitments arising from the EU’s 
neighborhood policy. 
4. The actor strategy of institutional build-up was identified in the 
creation of the mutual Warning Mechanism established after the 2006 gas 
crisis, leading to an increase in decisional autonomy of the Commission. 
The supply disruption in 2009 nevertheless reveals a mixed picture: On the 
one hand, due to the lack of a clear mandate for the EU Commission, 
functional pressures have not led to a spillover of gas security formal 
prerogatives from member states to the ‘High Authority’ in Brussels.  
5. Spill-around strategy: As a consequence of the Commission’s role as a 
broker in the trilateral gas talks, the EU’s supranational reach of action has 
expanded. The inception of the trilateral talks under the political leadership 
of the Commission has increased its scope of authority without being 
granted new formal competences. At the same time, this paper has 
discovered tendencies and risks of disintegration (‘spillbacks’) in gas 
security policies which have accompanied the EU at every major challenge:  
1. In the gas crisis of 2009 the non-use of the multilateral Energy Charter 
Treaty set a negative precedent for future supply disruptions, as formal 
competence for dispute settlement which had once been allocated to this 
contractual regime ‘spilled back’ to the national level. 
2. Political commitment to diversification might be pushed back by the 
EU’s own competition law in the future if the Commission has to grant 
Gazprom third-party access to the Southern Gas Corridor. 
3. As the state-to-state reality of gas delivery contracts is still in place, 
the risk of breaching the 2017 EU Decision on ex-ante compatibility check 
for energy deals with third countries is still imminent. 
A strategic recommendation for circumventing member states’ resistance to 
greater harmonization would be to better align EU gas supply legislation 
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with the broader environmental and climate change goals of the Energy 
Union, as environmental policy represents an area in which the EU has 
achieved a considerable level of integration.88 Building these connecting 
routes between various cognate policy fields would unlock additional 
potential for spillovers towards more effective EU integration. A strict 
adherence to the theoretical neofunctionalist model should not serve as an 
end in itself. Based on a compelling strategic judgment, selective 
integration measures are needed for EU gas security policy in order to 
circumvent divisive conflicts and to make it a unifying project. 
 
88  See Sohn, Rike (2016) EU environmental policy and diplomacy from Copenhagen 
to Paris and beyond, ZEI Discussion Paper C234, Center for European Integration 
Studies, Bonn, retrieved from https://www.zei.uni-bonn.de/dateien/discussion-
paper/DP_C234_Rike_Sohn.pdf (last accessed 1st of April 2017).   
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